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Salma A. Nageeb  
 
Appropriating the mosque:  
women’s religious groups in Khartoum1 
 
 
Summary 
 
This paper discusses the case of women’s mosques groups in the capital of 
Sudan which have considerably spread since the National Islamic Front 
(NIF) seized power in 1989. The paper empirically demonstrates how the 
mosque groups are forming a social space for women and how this is 
leading to the appropriation and transformation of a public-religious and 
a highly masculine space such as the mosque. The main argument of the 
paper maintains that the case of the mosque groups contests the undiffer-
entiated view that women in Islamic and specially Islamised societies are 
(necessarily) oppressed and that the only way to question the unequal 
gender relation and power structure is by getting away from religion. The 
paper asserts that, on the contrary, women active in mosque groups are 
claiming (more) power by becoming (more) religious. Through this power 
they constitute a space, transform public and religious ones and negotiate 
their gendered position vis-à-vis social and religious authorities and in-
stitutions.  
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n 2002, almost thirteen years after the Islamists seized power in Sudan 
and activated their Islamisation project, a migrant Sudanese, who was 
interviewed for this study, identified one of the social changes he noticed in 
the capital Khartoum as follows: ‘women’s attendance at mosques is a new 
phenomenon – mosques were always for men. Now you see young and old 
                                            
1  An earlier version of this article appeared in my book ‘New spaces and old frontiers. 
Women, social space and Islamization in Sudan’ (2004), Lanham, Lexington Books. Thus 
this article represents a continuation and update of my research on the mosque groups in 
Sudan. I conducted a follow up research on the mosque groups in 2004 – 2005 under the 
umbrella of the project ‘Negotiating development: translocal gendered spaces in Muslim 
societies’, Sociology of Development Research Centre, Faculty of Sociology, University of 
Bielefeld. The research project is funded by the Volkswagen foundation, and directed by 
Gudrun Lachenmann and Petra Dannecker.  
I 
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women coming at different times of the day.’ This paper focuses on the same 
issue: women’s mosque groups in the capital of Sudan.  
According to the observation of this migrant Sudanese, women’s 
mosque groups are identified as a new phenomenon, however, women’s 
attendance at mosques is an old practice. Since the establishment of the Funj 
sultanate (around 1505), mosques and khalwas2 in Sudan resembled impor-
tant socio-cultural and religious institutions. Besides their cultural, social 
and political functions, they were indeed the centre of Quranic and Islamic 
studies. According to the gendered social norms, boys had a greater chance 
than girls to get enrolled in Quranic schools; nevertheless (some) women 
were not only able to get (religious) education; a few were even khalwas’ 
directors.3 This form of religious education played a significant role in the 
processes of social transformation.  
For this reason, the relation of women to the institution of the mosque 
is not new, and in many ways it reflects the dynamics of the social structure 
and the processes of social transformations within a specific social context. 
The novelty of the phenomenon of the women’s mosque groups – the subject 
of this paper –, which is indicated in the above quotation, is not to separate 
the women’s mosque groups from their historical context. Rather it is to help 
us focus on how women nowadays find a ‘new’ gendered way of (re)situat-
ing themselves, expressing their religiosity, their forming agency and nego-
tiating the social order within the context of Islamisation in Sudan.  
So, in this paper, I shall focus on how the religious groups are forming 
a social space for women at the societal level, and how this is leading to the 
appropriation and transformation of a public/religious and a highly mascu-
line space, that is the mosque. I shall also show how the agency of the 
mosque groups is transforming not only women’s traditional and private 
spaces but also public/religious spaces. The point of this paper is to look at 
how women from different backgrounds claim an agency in a (formally) 
male dominated arena in an Islamised society. To do so, the paper will criti-
cally analyse the ‘taken for granted’ gendered division between private and 
public spaces by looking at how the example of the religious groups shows a 
link rather than a distinction between private and public spaces (Nelson 
1970, Moore 1986, Boddy 1989, Macleod 1991 and Werner 1997, Nageeb 
2004).  
                                            
2  Quranic schools were part of the activities of Sufi orders and were attached to a mosque 
or zawiya. The latter is a space for collective praying which is normally smaller than the 
ordinary mosque and unlike mosques a zawiya is not necessarily directed by an ‘author-
ised’ imam.  
3  Examples of such women are Aisha bint wad al-Gaddal, who led a Khalwa in Tuti Island 
and Fatma bint Jaber al-Rekabiya, who taught Quranic studies at the mosque of Awlad 
Jaber in the aj-Jazira area. 
Women’s religious groups in Khartoum 
 
7
Inspired by the work of Mahmood (2005) on the women’s mosque 
movement in Cairo, the agency approach which is adopted in this paper 
goes beyond limiting agency to the ability of the actors – women active in 
religious groups – to disturb the gendered social order or resist male domi-
nation in an Islamised society. Rather, agency is viewed as the capacity to 
act, which is created by and becomes possible within a specific relation of 
subordination (ibid: 18-20). The form of religiosity of the mosque groups is a 
lived and experienced way of life based largely on everyday Islamic prac-
tices and the gendered position of women within the context of Islamisation 
in Sudan. Through this and by positioning their Islamic practices in the so-
cial field, mosque groups are able to transform the very nature of the space 
they occupy, that is the mosque.  
The paper is based on an empirical research carried out in the capital of 
Sudan in 1999, and again in 2002 and 2004 to 2005.4 While I participated in 
the activities of more than five religious groups in Khartoum, I gained most 
of the in-depth insights by intensively studying three groups, and by fol-
lowing the everyday life of women active in these groups. 
The paper is organised in five parts. In the first part, the focus is on the 
relation between mosque groups and Islamist politics in Sudan. The second 
part is devoted to analysing the groups’ activities and the way they consti-
tute a social space for women. In the third part the discussion is on how the 
activities of the mosque groups are leading to the transformation of the 
mosque as a public space. The part that follows takes the discussion further, 
analysing how the agency of the mosque groups is situated in the wider 
social context. The conclusion sums up the above sections. 
 
 
Women's mosque groups: Islamisation project and gender 
 
During the holy month of Ramadan it was possible to observe crowds of peo-
ple heading for the mosque, including a large number of women, well cov-
ered with their toob (a traditional Sudanese dress) and hijab, carrying their 
                                            
4  Upon the request of most of the participants of this study, all persons remain anony-
mous. My accessibility to the field was rooted in my identity as a Sudanese, sociolo-
gist/social anthropologist and a gender specialist. These identities and my relationship 
(blood relationship, acquaintance or friendship) with many women active in mosque 
groups shaped my participatory observation in many ways: for example on the bases of 
my acquaintance with them, many participants were concerned that my knowledge about 
them and their lives is deep, including details that they were hesitant to expose. Therefore, 
they insisted on drawing clear boundaries between what is private knowledge and infor-
mation, and what should be considered public and hence can be published.  
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mushaf and walking in quick steps, after breaking their fast, so as not to miss 
the isha evening prayers.  
It was not only the holy month, which witnessed such a social change. 
A considerable number of women’s groups known as religious or Quranic 
groups (al-majmuat al-quraniyya) continued to meet in local mosques at par-
ticular times of the week to realise their objective of studying the Quran and 
Islamic studies. Yamani (1994: 279) and Mahmood (2005) analysed the exis-
tence of similar women’s groups in other Islamic countries, where women 
gather informally to further their knowledge about Islam. Both studies focus 
on how women’s agency is shaped within patriarchal Muslim societies. 
Mahmood’s (2005) profound analysis of the case of mosque groups in Cairo 
offers a deep insight into the struggle of women, who adopt an Islamic dis-
position, to situate themselves within the competing forces of Islamism, 
Western liberation and Arab nationalism. A closer look at the case of Sudan 
is considered here to highlight the relation between mosque groups and the 
state’s Islamisation project.  
The majority of the religious groups which I had access to, were resi-
dentially based, and usually unequally mixed in terms of class affiliation, the 
proportions depending on the nature of the residential area. In the case of 
the groups with which I had intensive contact, the class mixture was par-
ticularly clear because of the location of the mosque, which was constructed 
to serve the two neighbouring areas, an upper class and a poor one. The 
spontaneously self-organised groups of women were formed outside the 
state frame of the social non-governmental organisations, in the sense that 
they were not registered as organisations in the Ministry of Social Affairs, or 
the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) which is a government body 
regulating the work of non-governmental and voluntary organisations. They 
depended on individual resources and networking with relatives or other 
friends to support their activities. Thus, resources of the richer members of 
the group, like cars for example, were offered to facilitate the group’s activi-
ties; for instance transporting teachers who came from different areas of the 
capital. Furthermore, the group’s programme, schedule and content, were 
set in accordance with the convenience of the group and their teacher. The 
flexible nature of the groups’ organisation allowed for the participation of 
women from different levels of education. Those who showed progress 
could be promoted to other advanced groups in the capital. The groups were 
sensitive to the nature of the socially accepted codes, for example, the way 
women dress when going out for these meetings. In addition, the objective 
of the meetings, i.e. learning Quran and the timing for the use of the mosque, 
guaranteed community endorsement for the group. Accordingly, their gath-
erings were legitimised and praised as a form of social activity. 
Despite this seemingly independent status of the groups, the spread, 
popularity and activities of the mosque groups are in many ways embedded 
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within the context of Islamisation politics and project of NIF. Since the late 
1980s, the Muslim brothers or the members of NIF were involved in a vigorous 
process of Islamisation (see Beck 1998, Nageeb 2004, Seesemann 2005). NIF 
raised the slogan of Islamisation in order to achieve the aim of imposing a par-
ticular vision of Islam on all domains of life. Islamisation involves a process of 
cultural homogenisation guided by the notion of (the) Islamic society and its 
way of life. Islamisation is the claiming of an authentic Islam, or the juxtaposing 
of ‘the correct Islam’ with ordinary everyday life as lived by Muslims in Sudan 
(See Westerlund 1997). So it is a process of acculturation and social restructura-
tion. This process is creating distance from ‘traditions’, as they are viewed as 
not Islamic enough. At the same time it is promising a secure way of mastering 
modernisation in order not to lose identity.  
The Islamisation process, or the ‘construction of the umma’ as the Islamists 
in Sudan call it, can be explained by using Apppadurai’s notion of deterritori-
alisation (Appadurai 1991: 193). The umma or Islamic nation represents a mas-
ter narrative and a powerful vision of a ‘possible life’. As in many other similar 
cases, the success of the Islamisation project depends on the participation of 
women ‘[t]hus the contentious question of what the position of women should 
be like and how they should live, is at the present one of the most relevant 
issues not only of discourse but also of everyday life in Sudan’ (Seesemann 
2005: 96).  
To analyse the relation between the mosque groups and the Islamisa-
tion project, I will refer to two main discourses and mobilisation strategies, 
which are adopted by NIF. These are ijtihad (re-interpretation of Islamic 
texts) and tamkeen (empowerment). To discuss the first strategy – that is 
shaped around the Islamist discourse on ijtihad – NIF, which constituted 
clearly identified strata of intellectual elites,5 focuses on the role of the intel-
lectuals in the revitalisation of Islam in the present day. Thus, orthodox reli-
gious leaders and sheikhs are accused by NIF of advocating a narrow, re-
strictive and ‘frozen’ vision of Islam which is not able to meet the challenges 
of the present day. Khalfalla (2004: 111) argues that ‘the movement [NIF] 
saw itself, therefore, as a vehicle through which this intellectual vanguard 
could establish a new understanding of Islam, exercising ijtihad to develop 
practical laws and procedures.’ NIF’s concept of ijtihad is rather fluid: The 
problems of Muslims nowadays are due to the misinterpretation of Islam; 
Muslims need to replace traditional Islam with the lost authentic one and the 
                                            
5  Compared to Egypt where the basic support for the Muslim brotherhood during the 
1930s came from the urban proletariat and later developed among the intellectuals, in 
Sudan the Muslim brotherhood developed as an intellectual pressure group that basically 
focused on competing the leftist and secularist politics among students of universities and 
high schools. 
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latter has to be renewed according to the current situation of Muslims. Re-
newal or tajdid is thus at the core of the ijtihad of NIF.  
Using ijtihad discourse and strategy, various social, cultural and politi-
cal practices are (re)addressed by NIF to situate a new Islamic view of them 
in the social and political arenas. For example, the old civil war between the 
north and south of Sudan was reinterpreted as a holy war – a jihad. Exten-
sive and elaborated Islamic frames were offered and spread, through the 
media, NIF youth and students’ organisations and Islamic non-governmen-
tal organisations (NGOs), to change the public opinion about the conflict 
between the north and the south: from civil war to a jihad. Ijtihad practices 
and discourse are, thus, used in this specific case to: legitimise the call for a 
holy war, and support the Islamist policies towards the oppositional move-
ments in general and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army specifially. 
Ijtihad however is not only used to impose the ideology of jihad. Various 
other issues which are central to the politics of Islamism are subjected to 
NIF’s ijtihad. This includes issues which are especially debatable in many 
Muslim societies such as democracy, sharia law and women’s participation 
in public life, and gender politics.6 To focus on the latter, NIF’s ijtihad is basi-
cally characterised by the attempt to find a balance between the increasing 
presence of Sudanese women outside the domestic domain and the re-
quirements of their version of sharia laws and Islamisation project. There-
fore, women’s rights to education, employment and public participation 
depended on the observance of certain measures of religiosity, revealed 
through Islamic dress and abiding by the codes of public gender interaction 
(Al-Zubair 1994, Elbatahani 1994, Hale 1996, Alahmadi 2003, Nageeb 2004, 
Seesemann 2005).  
What is important here is that ijtihad as a discourse, a strategy and a 
practice of NIF, paved the way for many other actors to readdress various 
issues, which were viewed – before the implementation of the Islamisation 
project – from a ‘traditional’ Islamic perspective. This includes the practice 
of women’s attendance at mosques. 
To consider the second mobilisation strategy of NIF, that is the dis-
course on tamkeen (empowerment), it represents a political slogan, which 
                                            
6  Here I refer basically to the form of ijtihad, which was translated into state’s policies, 
practices and laws. NIF’s ijtihads in the area of women and women’s role in public life is a 
controversial subject. The leader of NIF (currently in the Islamist opposition party of the 
National Popular Party after the division of NIF in 2002), Dr. Hassan El-Turabi was – and 
still is – advocating progressive Islamic views on different issues such as marriage and 
hijab. His ijtihad on women’s issues was recently a topic on Arabic media and TV channels 
such as Al-Jazira, where he was confronted by various Islamic authorities, who condemned 
his opinions as radical and unislamic. His ijtihad on women issues was mainly significant 
at a discursive and intellectual level, as the policies of Islamisation were not activating 
many of his progressive thoughts. For more discussion of the subject see Seesemann 2005. 
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became a popular discourse, used by NIF political activists in general to 
reveal their view on political, social and economic transformations. It is 
widely used to mobilise people to adopt the position of NIF concerning 
West/Muslim relations.7 Among many things, tamkeen entails adopting and 
strengthening the sense of an Islamic identity to be able to face and over-
come economic, cultural and political forms of independency. To further 
elaborate on the meaning of tamkeen, it is worth considering the opinion of 
one of NIF’s famous activists in the area of women’s (Islamic) NGOs. Ac-
cording to the director of one of the biggest NGOs that collaborates closely 
with the state – umm al-muminin8 –, who was interviewed for this study, 
tamkeen ‘means enabling unprivileged and marginalised women to manage 
their lives in a better way. This includes also knowing better her religion, her 
rights and duties. In this way, women cannot “be played with” in the name 
of religion or [Western] civilisation’. Islamic knowledge and religious em-
powerment is considered to be central to the improvement of the social 
status of women. More importantly, tamkeen through religious knowledge is 
a means of popularising the politics of Islamism in Sudan. Accordingly, 
many Islamic NGOs working in the field of women and development are 
combining their activities with some preaching components. The missionary 
programmes of Islamic NGOs are implemented through activities such as 
Quran and religious classes, support of widows and orphans, and financial 
assistance for poor students. The systematic and intensive religious pro-
gramme and orientation of these NGOs played a considerable role in 
changing and addressing the gendered traditional social norms and the 
position of women. Particularly, these missionary activities focus explicitly 
on raising women’s awareness of their rights and duties according to Islam. 
Therewith, Islamic NGOs might provide women with a culturally legitimate 
frame to question their gendered social position. Notwithstanding, they load 
women with historical responsibilities of representing the Islamic nation and 
family honour as well as protecting their society from ‘the Western influ-
ences and cultural invasions’ (see for example Williams 2005, Nageeb 2004, 
Elbatahani 2004).  
                                            
7  The statement ‘we came to abolish feudalism, sectarianism and empower the powerless 
and the disadvantaged’ was used by president Omar El Bashir in one of his first official 
statements which he gave after the military coup on the 30th of June 1989. This statement 
became part of the official rhetoric used on different occasions to emphasise NIF’s empow-
erment strategy. The tamkeen discourse is even used to frame specific social and economic 
policies such as zakat and taxation. The latter are advocated by NIF as ‘policies for the 
empowerment of the poor’, in Arabic siyasat tamkeen al-fuqara.  
8  The name of the organisation umm al-muminin literary means the mother of the believers 
which is used to refer to Aìsha the youngest wife of Prophet Mohamed.  
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To discuss the relation between women’s mosque groups and the dis-
courses and strategies of ijtihad and tamkeen, which have been discussed 
above, we have to emphasise two points. First, that the mosque groups are 
self-organised groups, which are formed without direct support from state 
institutions or Islamist NGOs. Second, that women active in these groups 
insist on a depoliticised frame of self representation. This is consistently 
manifested by women active in mosque groups through sayings such as: we 
‘only seek the way of God’, ‘want to know the true religion’ and ‘don’t care 
about politics’. Such statements are repeatedly used by women when they 
are engaged in explaining and identifying the nature of their activities. De-
spite this apparently independent position of the mosque groups, there ex-
ists a link and a discursive proximity between the discourses of the mosque 
groups on the one hand and the Islamisation project on the other.  
To discuss this discursive proximity and the relation between mosque 
groups and Islamist politics, it is worth considering the local discourse on 
jihad. Jihad policies, ideology and discourses are one of the most popularised 
agendas of Islamists. According to the popular discourse on jihad, men were 
called upon – in the first place – for jihad in the south, whereas women’s 
jihad was clearly identified as ‘jihad al-mara fi baitiha wa-fi nashr al-dawa wa-
talim al-Islam’, meaning jihad for women is in her home, in the dawa and in 
spreading the teaching of Islam. This is a very popular statement that one 
hears almost everyday on either the Radio or TV. In addition, and as the 
findings of this research indicate, it is often repeated by activists in Islamic 
organisations while offering their educational programmes. The wider 
meaning of jihad – according to the Islamist politics – encompasses facing 
and challenging the ‘enemies of God’, who are against the establishment of 
the Islamic umma in Sudan. In particular, Muslims should defend Islam 
against enemies such as the Americans, Zionism, secularism, Communism, 
and even traditional Islamic authorities. Women active in mosque groups 
often use the statement about women’s jihad when they discursively repre-
sent their form of religiosity. They also link to the idea of tamkeen when they 
refer to how being a member in these groups is an empowering experience. 
To give an example, Ihssan, a 44 year old member of a mosque group, ex-
pressed the following during a group interview,  
 
because we were not learning Quran ourselves we were like cattle in the 
hands of the herd man. Now we know that we don’t need an intermediary 
to reach the way of God. We can do it alone.  
 
Mosque groups provide women with a socially and politically legitimate 
ground to challenge and question traditional social and religious authorities. 
They represent a space where the authentic Islamic norms, practices and 
modes of social interaction are set against both traditional Islam and non-
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Islamic practices. In this sense, mosque groups are ‘speaking the language’ 
of Islamism and reflecting how the Islamisation project gets socially and 
individually internalised and integrated. 
Recently in 2004-2005, the field research indicated more than a discur-
sive link between mosque groups and Islamist politics and institutions. 
Mosque groups, that indeed started during the early nineties as entirely self 
organised groups, began to link up with various Islamic NGOs which are 
supported by the state. This includes the clear link between some of the 
groups, on which this research focused, and the organisation of Islamic 
Dawa (Islamic missionary organisation). The Dawa organisation, located in 
an upper class quarter in Khartoum, occasionally provides many groups in 
this area with gifts such as Quran and other Islamic books, which are mainly 
produced in Saudi Arabia, or offers lectures for the women’s mosque groups 
from Sudanese as well as non-Sudanese Dawa activists. At the same time the 
organisation mobilises the women groups for various activities such as the 
collection of zakat and sadaqat, which the organisation redistributes in poor 
areas and regions. As will be elaborated on in the next part of the paper, this 
form of relation to Islamic organisations leads to the reshaping of the social 
interaction and relations between women active in mosque groups.  
Yet women mosque groups continue to present themselves and their 
practices as mainly religious and non-political. The depoliticised self repre-
sentation of the groups cannot be considered as merely a conscious strategy 
of women to distance themselves from the Islamisation project and the arena 
of politics in the sense of government and government institutions. Neither 
can it be argued that it is grounded on a ‘limited’ understanding of politics 
by women. Rather, the depoliticised self-representation of the mosque 
groups reflects how the agency of these women is embedded within the 
Islamised social and political structure. At the same time, this agency works 
beyond producing conformity to or stabilisation of the very Islamised 
structure in which it is embedded. Instead the agency of the women’s 
mosque groups can be grasped by focusing on the unexpected results of 
how religious practices are leading to the questioning of the (Islamic) male 
dominated structures and discourse on which the groups are grounded. 
Furthermore, the agency of the mosque groups challenges the very division 
between private and public spaces on which it is based. 
 
 
The mosque: group interaction and women’s social space 
 
At the back of the mosque, in the section designated for women, between ten 
to thirty women gather to learn Quran and some other Islamic studies. Only 
when the lesson was conducted by a visiting male sheikh, who may have 
been a member of the Dawa organisation, did the classes take an official or 
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formal shape. Otherwise, the classes were generally relaxed especially con-
cerning the teacher-women’s interaction. The teacher was addressed by her 
name or at most by the title hajja or shaikha. The women were freer to ask 
about private issues and domains. Most of these groups chose a quiet time of 
the day to conduct their meetings. They carried out their mosque pro-
gramme in the deadest time for men’s presence in the mosque, i.e. between 
late morning and noon prayers or between late afternoon and early evening 
prayers. Consequently, the Quran learning session was usually expanded to 
include intensive discussions of social and political issues, like whether to 
contribute to the government campaign of supporting the mujahidun in the 
south or not. A common heated political debate among different groups that 
I visited was the event of the 11th September, 2001. World politics as well as 
that of USA were the concern of the groups, additionally they intensively 
engaged in discussing whether the attack on the World Trade Centre is an 
Islamic act or not. Similarly, in late 2006, I learned that the issue of the cari-
catures of Prophet Mohammed that were published by a Danish newspaper, 
was consuming lots of the time designated for the Quran sessions. Many of 
the women’s groups were even active in organising the local demonstrations 
to condemn such an act.  
Topics that receive high attention and are subject to intensive discus-
sions in the groups are, women’s rights in Islam, gender relations in the 
institutions of marriage and the family, as well as women and gender inter-
action in public spaces. To cite an example, one of the sessions that was 
dominated by a weighty discussion which generated a sense of relief for the 
women in the end, was the one focusing on al-nisa or the women’s sura. The 
discussion was provoked particularly when explicating verse 34: ‘Men are in 
charge of women, because Allah hath made one of you excel over the other, 
and because they spend their property’.9 The teacher explained that this 
verse does not offer men any rights over women. Instead the word ‘gwa-
moun’, translated here as ‘in charge’, meant that men should serve women, 
not exploit them. To explain she cited the following examples:  
 
The doctor is in charge of the patient, therefore, the doctor serves the pa-
tient and treats him. The mother is in charge of the child, therefore, she 
cleans him, feeds him and plays with him and the servant is in charge of 
the house, therefore, he is supposed to serve it with cleaning, cooking or 
washing. Why is it different when it comes to women? It is the very same 
story and sheikh Sharawi, God’s blessing be upon his soul, confirmed this 
explanation of the verse: Men are to serve women, they are in charge of 
them, not to deplete or exhaust them. 
  
                                            
9  Translated by Mohammed M. Pickthall, Albany. 
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This newly gained religious insight provided women with a sense of relief, 
expressed by one of the women as ‘ignorance is a disaster, we kept believing 
what everyone says until we learned Quran ourselves’. In this respect, the 
women’s groups were the space where women could question their gender 
relations without running the risk of being negatively labelled. Furthermore 
they turned this theoretical knowledge into social skills of bargaining and 
negotiating the gender relations in their individual lives. Utilising this in-
sight, the women’s religious groups provided women with a space where 
they could question the gendered social order without violating that order.  
The groups also acted as a counselling forum, where women discussed 
their own social and psychological needs and sought each other’s support. 
Beyond the comforting words or gestures which they offered to each other 
in difficult times, they were willing and able to find solutions to specific 
problems. To mention examples: there was one seeking the support of wives 
of influential husbands to facilitate the migration of her husband to the Gulf 
to diminish her family’s economic vulnerability; there was another who 
appealed for social mediators to convince her daughter to keep her family 
together by going back to her marital home and trying to forget about ‘the 
inescapable problems caused by her in-laws’. All the above were accommo-
dated within the two hour sessions and the philosophy was explained by 
one of the women as:  
 
The strong Muslim is for the weak Muslim, we all pass through a time 
when we are strong and are weak. Helping others gives life meaning and 
helps you to overcome your own problems, God did not say a meaningless 
word.  
 
The religious practices of the mosque groups provided women with a sense 
of solidarity and a group spirit, which enabled them to face and address 
many of their everyday concerns in a collective way. The collectiveness of 
the group is shaped by a twofold process. On the one hand, as has been 
discussed above, women bond their activities and relationship with each 
other to a discourse on Islamic ethic of solidarity and support. This discourse 
gets translated into social actions and lived experiences that include social 
interaction in the mosque as well as other domains of women’s everyday 
and social life. On the other hand, the collectiveness, oneness or even har-
mony of the groups is also shaped by an othering process. Women mosque 
groups see themselves as different from both traditional Muslim and West-
ernised women, who are not actively seeking the way of God like they do 
and who – as one of the teachers of the groups explained during an inter-
view – ‘treat Islam as a folklore but not as the governing principle of life’. 
The pedagogic component of the mosque activities is very significant as it 
locates the collective agency of the women’s mosque groups in the social 
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field. This component aims at placing religious practices, which include a 
wide range of activities, from dress code and interaction in public, to sexual 
relations with the husband or eating manners, as well as (the) correct modes 
of social interaction. Consequently religiosity becomes a socially (and indeed 
politically) recognised (and authorised) frame and an objective that brings 
different women together. However, religiosity or the Islamic practices of 
the mosque groups are also grounds on which to achieve self-realisation and 
individual goals. This is clear if one follows the biography of those who 
started as members of the groups and later got promoted to the status of a 
hajja or shaikha (teacher or instructor). Those whose status changed – from 
members of the groups to teachers over a period of time, which is not less 
than 5 years – are mainly of a specific social profile. They have either secon-
dary education or above, but not less, and they belong to well-to-do strata. 
While the groups have no formalised criteria of who can be upgraded to the 
status of a teacher, there are various factors which structure this possibility. 
Principally, those who manage to progress in their Islamic studies within the 
context of the mosque or Quranic groups can become teachers or instructors 
of the very groups. However, in reality, only well-to-do women were able to 
do so. This is explained by Nafisa, a 47 years old woman and one of the 
oldest members of a Quranic group formed in 1994. She said :  
 
I never wanted to be a shaikha, it is enough for me to learn Quran. Those 
[who can become teachers of the groups] are having enough time not like 
me. They have Ethiopians [as domestic help] who do all the house chores. 
They have time to attend more than three groups’ sessions per week and 
they can study Quran all day through thus they can learn a lot by heart. 
But those like me can hardly manage: we have a husband who wants his 
shirts clean, children who want food and a house which needs cleaning 
and some order. Additional to these, you have to run around using public 
transportations, we lack a private car or a driver who waits to take you 
from here to there. How can you then learn that much of Quran by heart? 
Allah knows, Alhamdoli Allah! He is there and He knows that I am doing all 
that I can. 
 
Open conflicts between groups’ members are consciously avoided and are 
tackled and accommodated at a very early stage by employing and acti-
vating Islamic solidarity ethic and discourses. However, conflictive interests 
between members of the groups can be observed. They might arise when 
the task of self realisation of a member of a group is perceived by the others 
as overriding the collective sense of the group. Mobilising private resources 
for the groups is appreciated as a religiously sanctioned attitude. However, 
mobilising the same resources for individual purposes such as achieving a 
higher religious status is occasionally viewed with a critical eye. An exam-
ple of this situation is when the Dawa organisation announced one of its 
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advanced and intensive courses on dawa for women in 2004. Upon comple-
tion of such courses, women are awarded a certificate as daiya, that is, an 
authorised Islamic missionary worker. To become a shaikha in one of the 
Quranic groups, one does not necessarily need such a certificate. Notwith-
standing this, the hierarchical ranking between a hajja or shaikha without a 
Dawa certificate and a certified missionary worker is important. For social 
mobility in the field of Islamic missionary work, a training certificate from 
Dawa is of a great value. Consequently their religious status and knowledge 
would be highly recognised (officially). The fact that only two members of 
the group who had studied this were able to attend the course, evoked a 
sense of competition and a conflict of interests. This is an example of occa-
sions when class, educational and ethnic differences and inequalities be-
tween the groups’ members were cited to explain subtle conflicts or com-
petition. 
Significant to note here is that this form of relations between mosque 
groups and Islamic organisations, such as Dawa, is gradually leading to the 
formalisation and hierarchical ordering of the groups. In the sense that 
groups which manage to intensify their link to Dawa (or any other Islamic 
organisation), often receive an authorised Dawa specialist to give lessons and 
when some of its members are awarded a Dawa certificate, they are then 
considered by other groups as ‘advanced’, ‘established’ or ‘serious’. This 
leads to the hierarchical ordering of the groups in terms of which one is 
better linked to an Islamic institution. The success of certain groups in link-
ing up with a reputable Islamic institution is leading to the hierarchical for-
mation of the groups, which relates advancement of the groups to the social 
status and class positions of (some) of its members. By situating their collec-
tive and group agency in the social field, mosque groups are able to consti-
tute a social space for women. This space is maintained despite conflicts that 
might arise when self-realisation endeavours of some group members, or the 
relations between a group and an Islamic organisation remind the others of 
social differences and inequalities. In the next section, we shall see how the 
agency of mosque groups leads to the unintended result of transformation of 
a (male) public and religious space.  
 
 
‘Domesticating’ the mosque: transformation of a public space 
 
The mosque was gradually being transformed into a mixed gender space if 
not a social space for women. An exemplifying situation in this regard was 
in the year 2002, when one of the groups was engaged in protecting the 
physical space designated for women at the mosque from being abolished in 
order to expand the men’s space. At a session which I attended at the peak 
of this event, the teacher, who lived in the same area, asked women about 
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the progress they had made to prevent the move to enlarge the men’s section 
of the mosque by breaking the walls that separated the women’s space in the 
mosque. It was the clarification by the women of the preventive measure-
ments they were taking against this move that conveyed the strong sense of 
political organisation among them. Some mobilised their influential hus-
bands to protect the group’s right to women’s space in the mosque. Others 
invited other women’s groups from the neighbourhood to conduct their 
session, in the morning time, in the very same mosque, to defeat the argu-
ment that it was an under-utilised space. For her part, the teacher explained 
that she was working on a statement to be issued from the Ministry of Reli-
gious Affairs against this move. Therefore, using different possible social 
networks, women were able to protect both their physical as well as social 
space at the mosque. Similar strategies like the ones discussed above were 
utilised, and most importantly a discourse on religious rights of women was 
effectively mobilised. 
However, not only is the physical space of the mosque being trans-
formed to include a space for women, but the social space is being reshaped 
as well. A case that demonstrates this is the one often cited by the group 
with which I had intensive contact. A woman described this example as 
follows: 
  
The group there [in x part of the capital] is very good, and has very strong 
women. You know, they are taking their kids to the mosque with them and 
they make the imam teach them Quran while they are having their lesson. If 
we do the same, many more women with small children will come.  
 
So, I decided to visit this group, too. In the company of a young mother who 
participates in this group, I entered the mosque. The young woman walked 
with her child to the men’s section of the mosque. As it was not a praying 
time, there were only a few men in the men’s hall; one was sitting in the 
middle of the room surrounded with about six children between the ages of 
four to six. The man was the imam of the mosque who led the five prayers of 
the day in this particular mosque. Throughout the two hours’ meeting dur-
ing which women were engaged in their lesson, I kept hearing the voice of 
the children repeating after the imam, short verses from the Quran. Women 
were indeed very relieved to have a sort of day care for their children within 
the mosque, where they can continue their activities but at the same time 
‘not worry much about who will stay with the kids, or what the girl10 might 
be doing with them at home,’ as one of the women explained to me. They 
managed to change the men’s hall of the mosque into a short time day-care 
and to include children’s hours within the weekly activities of the imam. 
                                            
10  Girl is a term locally used to mean a domestic help.  
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The example of the children’s day-care hours in the mosque is not the 
only effect of domesticating or transforming the mosque space into a space 
responsive to the needs of women. Women, like in this case, attempted to 
make the mosque more responsive to their needs. What they tried to do, as 
has been explained previously, was to place some of their domestic activities 
in the public (and men’s) space of the mosque. They domesticated the 
mosque not only by moving some of their domestic duties to it, but con-
sequently handing this duty to a state employee, (the imam) during his offi-
cial working hours.  
Another example, which I encountered in this regard is noted in my 
field diary as follows: 
 
Asma [another woman active in one of these groups], phoned me yester-
day to tell me that today, they [the women co-participants in her religious 
group] are organising a small party after the session to welcome Fathia and 
celebrate her safe arrival from Cairo after having a medical check up there. 
Together with Asma, I joined the group and attended the session, which 
started at 10 in the morning. Towards the end of the session, I was thinking 
I forgot to ask my companion about the place where the small party would 
be held. I thought probably we would move to one of the nearby women’s 
houses and have some snacks and drinks there. (...) While I was thinking of 
collecting my things and getting ready to go out, women started unpacking 
the extra bags and baskets they were carrying. I asked my neighbour about 
whether today we are not celebrating Fathia’s arrival. She confirmed this 
and explained to me that they are doing it here at the mosque. And that 
‘for quite some time now we celebrate many things here at the mosque, 
everyone brings what she can prepare, anything even if only ice to cool 
water and then we sit here together and eat something little, send some-
thing to the imam’s family to eat as well, pray and leave. It is better than the 
extravagancy and big things at homes, you know they are expensive and 
one needs to work a lot to host such a group (nineteen women) at home. 
We make it simple and without too much expenses.  
 
One could argue that the practice of serving foods and drinks in the mosque 
is not a new one, as it is a habit of many people especially during the holy 
month of Ramadan to take a tray of food prepared in the early evening for 
breaking the fast. However, this practice is strictly perceived to be men’s 
religious duty. The logic behind it is to strengthen the sense of Muslim col-
lective identity (and collect good deeds) by offering whatever one can afford 
to others who might be in need of it. Women are traditionally restricted from 
eating with non-relative men and eating in the public spaces.11 Thus, women 
                                            
11  This is particularly the case with grown-up and elderly women. However, the younger 
generation is slowly breaking with this tradition, particularly young women who are 
studying at universities or those who are employed.  
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prepare the food and this is their contribution to the sense of Muslim collec-
tivity, but it is men’s duty to place it in the public space, be it the mosque or 
simply in front of the house door, for those who might like to join. The use 
of the mosque space by women as explained above is, thus, a new practice 
that came into existence after women increasingly claimed the mosque 
space. The logic behind it, as explained by the woman above, is to avoid un-
necessary expense and to simplify the social nature of women’s parties or 
gatherings, rather than to fulfil a religious duty. While this was my first 
encounter with this practice, it did not remain the last. Women continued to 
organise such gatherings at the mosque and the mosque is increasingly 
hosting ‘domestic’ affairs.  
In the above discussion, the collective agency of the groups has been em-
phasised because it is central to understanding how the mosque is being trans-
formed and how women place this collective agency in the male dominated 
space. However, it is, nevertheless, important to consider how the group itself 
interacts while ‘domesticating’ the mosque and what the different positions of 
women are regarding this act of transformation. 
While the sense of collectiveness and solidarity were strong when women 
were engaged in defending their right to a physical space in the mosque, it was 
not so in the two other cases. Using the mosque as a day-care facility or as a 
space to celebrate social occasions did not go without dispute between mem-
bers of the groups. The concerns of those who objected or who were critical 
about such practices were centred on the possible (male) perceptions and re-
actions towards the inclusion of non-religious practices in the mosque.  
Asma, a 40-year-old mother referred to her co-members, who bring their 
children to the mosque as well as those who support this practice, as blinded 
by ‘women’s things, they are unaware of the difference between private places 
and public places like the mosque’. Those who oppose these acts hold on to the 
dichotomy between public (serious) work and domestic (not serious) work. 
Consequently, maintaining the publicity of the mosque – by avoiding con-
ducting some domestic activities in it – would give their work of learning 
Quran and Islamic studies a status of being ‘serious work’. Acts of transferring 
women’s domestic and social duties to the mosque would threaten the activi-
ties of the mosque groups by being classified as ‘women’s things’ and not seri-
ous work.  
Women who argued against the transformation of the mosque did not 
manage to stop the others from domesticating the mosque. However, their op-
positional stand made women, who were for the act of ‘domesticating’ the 
mosque, more conscious about their attitude. For instance, the task of cleaning 
up after having social gatherings in the mosque was conducted more con-
sciously. Children were also often controlled by their mothers, who interrupted 
their sessions and ran to the front section of the mosque to signal to their chil-
dren to be quiet, whenever they became wild. More importantly again, in this 
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case classes and social status’ were used by members of the groups to explain 
why some women were opposed to the act of transforming the mosque. Those 
who opposed were classified as rich and could afford good domestic help, had 
no small children or had family members to help them with their mothering 
and domestic duties. Mona, a 39 year old mother who brought her son along 
with her, explained this as follows, ‘their hands are not in fire like us, there are 
others who are doing this work [child care] for them’.  
What has to be emphasised here is that this type of disagreement and con-
flictive interest was not allowed to surface and break or affect the group’s col-
lective identity and cohesion. Critical views, statements and impressions about 
co-members were basically revealed in the private and small circles of those 
who have close relations – neighbourhood, friendship or blood relationship – 
with each other. When the group members were together they tried their best 
to rationalise and accommodate differences and disagreements within the 
frame of Islamic solidarity and the ethics of social interaction. While doing so 
they transformed the mosque into a women’s space. 
 
 
Transforming women’s traditional social spaces 
 
The religious knowledge and status that the women active in these religious 
groups are able to accumulate can be seen as a social and cultural force. This 
force is not only transforming the mosque space by ‘domesticating’ it but the 
process of (re)placing and social (re)positioning of the religious women in-
volves a wider form of social transformation, namely the transformation of 
‘traditions’ and ‘traditional’ spaces. 
I also attended a series of sessions with one of the religious groups 
from my neighbourhood. One of the reasons that made me join in was the 
women’s great excitement about the visiting sheikh, who is a known religious 
figure. The visiting sheikh who was teaching the group for four consecutive 
sessions on ‘religion is conduct’, indicated how the group should interact in 
these ‘traditional’ social spaces:  
 
My Muslim sisters, you go to weddings and funerals, and you can see with 
your very same eyes how people are turning away from Islam. Muslims 
vie, boasting with their food, clothes, furniture and houses. Refrain from 
boasting that God favours the Muslim only on the basis of his religion. 
Help your other sisters to refrain from what makes religion die in the 
hearts of weak Muslims. It is a good phenomenon to see some of you re-
frains from gossip and nonsensical talk with other women at social occa-
sions but preferring to recite Quran, or talking about religious issues. Fol-
low the good model of conduct and refrain from what makes God angry 
and what makes the Muslim nation weak ... 
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I was invited to the naming party of a grandson of one of the women (Dalia, 
40 years) who was very active in religious groups (see Nageeb 2004). Al-
though she was very busy with her social duties as hostess, she made the 
time and the space to indicate a redefinition of the occasion. The lunch invi-
tation was extended to a large number of men and women, served sepa-
rately. A female singer, who was to entertain only the women, was the only 
compromise that the family reached after long negotiations. Dalia’s children, 
including her son in-law, wished to have a bigger night-time party with a 
male singer and a relaxed gender spacing arrangement. Dalia however per-
sistently refuted the idea, and only reluctantly accepted the idea of a female 
singer while keeping to segregative space arrangement. During a break the 
singer took from her entertainment job and Dalia from her work as hostess, 
Dalia carried in her new grandchild and joined the sub-group of her friends 
from the religious group. A few moments after she found her space there, 
the voice of women praying, reciting special parts of the Quran and chorus-
ing ‘amin’ travelled all through the women’s space. The louder the praying 
and Quran recitation, the more attention was attracted to this small group. A 
large number of women started to cluster around Dalia and her friends, 
standing and sitting around them, and Dalia proudly said, ‘It is our turn to 
celebrate the baby, you all say amin, let the blessing of the prayers go to all of 
you and to all to whom you wish goodness.’ 
The praying continued, and each of the ‘religious’ women had their 
turn to lead the prayers. By this time the crowd had become even larger, and 
now even included the female singer with her hands up to the sky. The focus 
on the well-being, health and future of the baby shifted to include prayers 
for the well-being of everyone, success for their children, health for their 
husbands and the wish for the joy of joining the Prophet Mohammed in 
heaven. The act produced a high level of emotion among the women’s 
crowd (to the extent that the first song with which the singer started after 
her break was a religious one, mainly a tribute to the Prophet Mohammed). 
Dalia was very satisfied with the accomplishment of this move, as it changed 
the whole atmosphere of the occasion.  
This was not the only encounter that made religious women remind 
others of Allah. At a wake in my neighbourhood, I noted how women active 
in the religious groups murmured to the grown-up grandchild of the de-
ceased person that it might be better to recite and invite others to recite 
Quran than to keep on crying.12  
                                            
12  The changes in the wake sermonised in rural Sudan have been studied by Klein-
Hessling (1999), her analysis is in line with this discussion. 
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However, there were conflicting views about redefining women’s social 
spaces as women’s religious spaces. An elderly woman expressed this view 
when she said:  
 
Even the prophet cried when his son Ibrahim died, these women are 
holding to religion without knowing it right. They suppress our breath 
wherever we go, ‘Don’t cry, read Quran’, the other day I shouted at one of 
them – I told her that she has nothing to do with what is between me and 
Allah. Crying is crying and worshipping is worshipping. 
 
Some others, who were not necessarily organised in any sense along a reli-
gious or political line, but submitted to its superiority over ‘tradition’, were 
inclined to the view that ‘it is good to keep away from gossiping and chat-
ting, all of it is a sin. When our daughters learn the right way, they can also 
show it to us’. A third group with which I had the opportunity to exchange 
views on this matter were stricter in their ‘religious’ classification: 
 
This is a bid‘a, specially reading Quran sections in groups to pray for dead 
Muslims. It was never done either during the Prophet’s lifetime, or the 
time that followed. After all, Muslims must be careful with what they in-
novate. Each can read Quran, the whole of it, for her dead people, but sit-
ting in groups while others are talking or laughing without respect for the 
Holy Book, this can never be a religious way, it is a bid‘a of the kizan. Like 
ars el shaheid13, they don’t know enough of the religion but they keep on 
innovating. Innovation in Islam has rules and regulations; it is not for eve-
rybody to do. 
 
At any rate, women in the religious groups remained a social agent involved 
in reshaping and redefining the social occasions along the lines of the newly 
gained religious knowledge. The move inspired not only the classification of 
social occasions as a space to ‘follow the model of the good Muslims’ ac-
cording to the sheikh’s advice. Social occasions were also the space whereby 
the socially growing women’s religious groups strive to legitimise their 
knowledge and social presence. Redefining social occasions was an act that 
on an individual level, unveiled the social hierarchical change that women 
                                            
13  Literally translated as the ‘wedding of the martyr’. It is one of the slogans used by the 
activists of the NIF to redefine the wakes of those who were killed in the war as a wedding 
rather than a wake. In such a case, the activists move with their drums, singers and gifts to 
the family concerned. There they present their monetary and other gifts, deliver speeches 
about jihad and martyrdom, sing for the martyr, who is believed to be granted seventy 
virgin wives in heaven. Hence his death must be celebrated, not grieved over. Activists 
usually interfere in the ‘traditional’ way of expressing grief; in some cases they even take 
the lead in presenting the visitors with sweets and dates, the last thing to be considered 
acceptable on such occasions.  
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were able to achieve by including religiosity as another criterion of social 
differentiation and the legitimisation of social power.  
 
 
On being ‘religious’: a conclusion 
 
‘Being religious’ formed the way the groups distinguished themselves, built 
their symbolic capital, took a place in the hierarchy and accordingly legiti-
mised their struggle for a social space. The objective of the groups validated 
women’s use of the mosque and granted them a physical space in it. It also 
legitimised their demand for time to partake in the group activities and 
sanctioned their social and physical mobility to follow up a warranted cause. 
The cultural – and indeed also the religious – disposition of the groups en-
abled them to compete with other social forces, particularly those who are 
defined as traditional Muslims. By situating this disposition in the social 
field, women managed to establish their social space. 
The case of the mosque groups shows how it is central to also focus on 
the link rather than the distinction and separation between private and pub-
lic spaces, when studying women in Islamised societies. The transformation 
of a highly public and male space like the mosque to be more responsive to 
the way women are socially domesticated is a case in hand. Similarly signifi-
cant are the ways in which ‘traditional’ women’s spaces are (re)defined as 
spaces to position the ‘new’ religiosity in the social field. In this sense, no 
social space remains purely ‘private’, ‘public’, ‘domestic’, ‘religious’ or ‘tra-
ditional’. Boundaries are constantly subject to processes of transformation, 
redefinition and restructuration.  
The case of the mosque groups contests the view that women in Islamic 
and specially Islamised societies are (necessarily) oppressed and victimised 
and that the only way to question the unequal gender relation and power 
structure is by getting away from religion. On the contrary, the case of the 
mosque groups shows how (some) women, in the context of an Islamised 
society, are claiming (more) power by becoming (more) religious. Through 
this power they create a space, transform public and religious ones and ne-
gotiate their gendered position vis-à-vis social and religious authorities and 
institutions. The case of the mosque groups reflects how Islamisation politics 
and ideologies are penetrating and restructuring society. However, at the 
same time, the agency of these groups demonstrates how unintended acts – 
such as ‘domesticating’ or transforming the mosque, which in this case were 
caused by the subordinate position of women, are central to understanding 
how Islamisation politics leads to social transformation. 
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Zusammenfassung 
 
Seit der Machtübernahme der  National Islamic Front (NIF) 1989 bildeten sich in 
den Moscheen der Hauptstadt des Sudan immer mehr Frauengruppen. Der 
vorliegende Beitrag vermittelt, auf welche Weise diese Moscheegruppen gesell-
schaftlichen Raum für Frauen herstellen, sich den religiös-öffentlichen, männlich 
bestimmten Raum der Moschee aneignen und ihn transformieren. Die Autorin 
betont, dieses Fallbeispiel der Moscheegruppen widerspreche der undifferen-
zierten Ansicht, Frauen in islamischen und speziell in islamistischen Ländern 
seien (notwendigerweise) unterdrückt und die Infragestellung ungleicher Ge-
schlechterbeziehungen und Machtstrukturen setze eine Abwendung von der 
Religion voraus. Das Gegenteil sei der Fall: Frauen, die in Moscheegruppen aktiv 
sind, beanspruchen (mehr) Macht, indem sie religiös(er) werden. Sie transfor-
mieren öffentliche und religiöse Räume und handeln mit sozialen und religiösen 
Autoritäten und Institutionen geschlechtsspezifische Positionen aus.  
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Résumé 
 
Depuis la prise du pouvoir du National Islamic Front (NIF) en 1989, des groupes 
de femmes de plus en plus nombreux se forment dans les mosquées de la capi-
tale du Soudan. Cet article montre de quelle manière ces groupes créent un es-
pace social pour les femmes qui les conduit à s’approprier l’espace publique 
religieux dominé par les hommes de la mosquée et à le transformer. Pour 
l’auteure de cet article, le cas de ces groupes de femmes dans les mosquées 
contredit l’idée que les femmes dans les pays musulmans et en particulier dans 
les pays islamistes seraient (nécessairement) opprimées et que le seul moyen de 
remettre en cause l’inégalité homme/femme et les structures de pouvoir serait 
de se détourner de la religion. L’auteure montre au contraire que les femmes 
actives dans ces groupes exigent plus de pouvoir, en devenant plus religieuse. 
Grâce à cela, elles transforment les espaces publiques et religieux et négocient 
des positions spécifiques au genre avec les institutions et autorités sociales et 
religieuses. 
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